The Case of the New Judicial Reform

The constitutional reform of the Judiciary promoted by President Sheinbaum dismissed some of the central areas of consensus that could have improved the quality of justice.

By Susana Camacho and Jorge Carbajal*

The publication on June 2 of the constitutional reform of the Judiciary promoted by President Claudia Sheinbaum accomplished one thing: it provided much-needed operational relief by postponing the election scheduled for 2027 until 2028. However, this amendment—approved through an extraordinary, rushed legislative process, without substantive deliberation—disregarded some of the key points of consensus reached by academia, the judiciary, and civil society.

Ignored Efforts to Build Broad Consensus

Following the shortcomings and risks observed in the first judicial election of 2025, various sectors of civil society, academia, and the legal profession proposed reforms to improve future processes. Among the main proposals were: 1) preventing judicial elections from coinciding with the ordinary political elections of 2027; 2) replacing current requirements, such as grade-point averages of 8 or 9 out of 10 and letters of recommendation from neighbors, with competency certifications that better assess the experience, knowledge, and skills required for judicial office; and, 3) strengthening candidate suitability assessments through standardized criteria.

In response to these concerns, on April 21, 2026, legislators from Morena introduced a constitutional reform initiative in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate regarding the election of judges. The proposal sought to separate judicial elections from partisan electoral processes, reduce politicization through greater participation with the National Electoral Institute (INE), and improve candidate’s technical qualifications through competency certifications. The proposal also sought to establish objective evaluation criteria and strengthen the institutional management of the Supreme Court and the Federal Judicial Administration Body.

Subsequently, on April 23, 2026, a forum organized by the Senate Justice Committee, the Network for Judicial Independence (RIJ), and the Permanent Electoral Integrity Observatory (OPINE) brought together legislators, electoral authorities, civil society organizations, academics, and other stakeholders to discuss improvements to the judicial election model. The main consensus was to propose postponing the 2027 judicial elections until 2028.

The purpose of this proposal was to avoid overlap with federal elections, reduce operational pressures on the INE, lessen the influence of partisan dynamics, and provide more time to develop a competency certification model based on international standards.

However, on May 20, 2026, President Claudia Sheinbaum submitted a constitutional reform initiative concerning the Judiciary to the Permanent Commission of Congress. This led to an extraordinary legislative session for discussion and approval, all of which took place in fewer than 15 days. Discussions in committee and in the plenary sessions of both legislative chambers remained largely confined to positions either supporting or opposing the presidential initiative. The exception was a number of Morena legislators—including Mariana Benítez, Alfonso Ramírez Cuéllar, Olga Sánchez Cordero, and Javier Corral—who introduced amendments bills under consideration and had previously promoted an alternative initiative to that of the Executive Branch.

In Congress, voting followed strict party lines with no room for dissent: Movimiento Ciudadano, PRI, and PAN voted against, while Morena, the Labor Party, and the Green Party voted in favor. The majority coalition also introduced electoral proposals, including the possibility of holding judicial elections concurrently with political elections. Although this change would not apply in 2028, it would permit the presidential recall referendum to be held alongside the judicial election. Other proposals included annulling elections due to interference by foreign actors and assigning the INE responsibility for verifying the integrity of candidates in all types of election, a challenging task for an institution not designed for that purpose. Despite the sensitivity and potential implications of these issues, they were not discussed in depth.

Content and Omissions of the New Judicial Reform

In addition to postponing the next judicial election until 2028, the new reform establishes a coordinating commission composed of one representative from each Evaluation Committee to standardize selection criteria. It also requires the Senate’s call for applications to be issued in April of the year preceding the election, reduces the number of candidates to two per branch of government for each position while maintaining gender parity, and provides for vote counting at polling stations. It further allows concurrence with a presidential recall referendum, sets rules for defining judicial electoral districts by the INE, requires sitting judges seeking another elected judicial office to step down from their positions, prohibits partisan interference in the process, and harmonizes rules and procedures for local judicial elections.

Nevertheless, the new judicial reform fails to address a key issue in improving the profile and suitability of candidates participating in judicial elections. Specifically, it does not amend the requirements for serving as a Supreme Court minister, magistrate, or judge established in Articles 95 and 97 of the Constitution. To ensure that candidates possess the skills necessary to perform judicial functions properly, the reform should have required candidates to obtain a competency certification issued by the National School for Judicial Training. Without this change, neither the Coordinating Commission nor the Evaluation Committees will be able to guarantee candidate suitability based on objective and standardized criteria.

Given the proximity of the next election, it would be advisable for the call for applications to continue being issued in September, as currently established. This would provide sufficient time to design a rigorous competency certification model based on international standards, potentially through the legislation implementing the constitutional reform. However, there appear to be limited prospects for such improvements in light of what became evident during the extraordinary legislative session: A preference for a greater Executive control over the Judiciary rather than stronger mechanisms to ensure that judges possess the necessary skills and competencies.

Restarting the Process and New Opportunities

With the postponement of the judicial election until 2028, there is, at least, a legal opportunity to introduce regulatory changes to the judicial system before those elections take place.

At present, there are no political conditions for eliminating the judicial election model and returning to a strengthened judicial career system. Particularly in the case of judges and magistrates, the priority should be replacing grade-point average requirements and letters of recommendation from neighbors with the successful completion of a competency certification endorsed by the National School for Judicial Training. This element is essential to ensuring the suitability of candidates in judicial elections and the qualifications of those elected to deliver high-quality judicial decision-making.

The judicial election model is being put to the test, and citizens will ultimately assess whether it improves or undermines access to justice in Mexico. Meanwhile, international pressures and legal uncertainty affecting investment in Mexico are unlikely to subside in the coming months.

* Jorge Carbajal is the alliances coordinator for the Justice Program at México Evalúa, and Susana Camacho is the program’s general coordinator. Originally published in Spanish in Animal Político